This paper investigates regime switching in the response of U.S. output to a monetary policy action. We find substantial, statistically significant, time variation in this response, and that this time variation corresponds to "high response" and "low response" regimes. We then investigate whether the timing of the regime shifts are consistent with three particular manifestations of asymmetry by modeling the transition probabilities governing the switching process as a function of state variables. We find strong evidence that the regime shifts can be explained by whether the economy is in a recession at the time the policy action was taken. In particular, policy actions taken during recessions seem to have larger effects than those taken during expansions. We find much less evidence of any asymmetry related to the direction or size of the policy action.
Introduction
Since at least the Great Depression, economists have argued that the impact of monetary policy actions on the real economy is not symmetric with respect to economic conditions or the nature of the policy action. In recent years, interest in such asymmetry has experienced a resurrection, as evidenced by a growing body of empirical work.
1 This literature has focused on three particular manifestations of asymmetry: 1) Asymmetry related to the direction of the monetary policy action, 2) asymmetry related to the existing business cycle phase and 3) asymmetry related to the size of the policy action.
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Such asymmetry implies time variation in the coefficients measuring the response of output to a monetary policy action. In this paper we use a Markov regime-switching model to capture this time variation. To investigate whether the time variation is consistent with specific asymmetries, we define state variables by which side of a dividing line some characteristic of an indicator variable, which could be the monetary policy action itself, falls. We then allow the transition probabilities governing the regime-switching process to be a function of these state variables. We use this time-varying transition probability (TVTP) framework to evaluate the evidence for each of the three asymmetries mentioned above.
The results suggest substantial, statistically significant, time variation in the coefficients describing the response of output to a monetary policy action, and that this time-variation corresponds to "high response" and "low response" regimes. We find strong evidence that the time variation can be explained by a state variable indicating whether the economy is in a recession at the time the policy action was taken. In particular, policy actions taken during recessions seem to have larger effects than those taken during expansions. We find that this result is robust across the historical record of business cycles, that is, it does not appear to be driven by only a small subset of recessions. We find much less evidence of any asymmetry related to the nature of the policy action, such as its direction or size.
This paper attempts to advance the existing empirical literature in three ways. First, that literature tests for asymmetry by allowing the coefficients of an equation linking real activity to policy variables to be state dependent, where the states are linked to a particular asymmetry.
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Our approach instead focuses on modeling the time variation in the coefficients linking output to policy, without forcing that time variation to correspond to a particular asymmetry. Indeed, the TVTP framework we use is capable of capturing the coefficient time variation in the data, even if all of the state variables we use to explain this time variation are statistically insignificant. An advantage of this approach is that it allows us to evaluate the robustness of the evidence for any particular asymmetry, as the estimated pattern of time variation can be used to determine whether that evidence is coming from only a small subset of episodes, or is robust across the historical record.
A second contribution of this paper is its focus on several manifestations of asymmetry and measures of monetary policy. As opposed to much of the literature, which investigates only one asymmetry at a time, we investigate all three asymmetries discussed above. This is useful as it is likely that these asymmetries are correlated, making it difficult to determine the "true"
asymmetry from independent investigations of each. We also consider different measures of monetary policy actions, including monetary policy "shocks" obtained from identified VAR's 2 A smaller literature investigates asymmetry in the effects of monetary policy depending on the level of economic activity relative to trend. We do not investigate this type of asymmetry in detail in this paper.
and an endogenous measures of monetary policy, namely the change in the real federal funds rate.
Finally, we investigate these issues using an unobserved-components decomposition of real output into trend and cyclical components. The structural representation in terms of trend and transitory components allows for the introduction of monetary policy variables such that policy actions have only short run effects on the economy. This is as opposed to the majority of the literature, which generally proceeds by regressing output growth on measures of policy actions.
Our approach is closest in spirit to Garcia and Schaller (2002) , Kaufmann (2002) , Peersman and Smets (2001) , Ravn and Sola (1999) , Thoma (1994) and Weise (1999) . As in our model, the first four papers employ a regime-switching framework to investigate asymmetry in the effects of monetary policy. However, each ties the regime switching on the coefficients of the policy variables to a particular manifestation of asymmetry. In the first three papers the regime switching is connected to switching of the economy from boom to recession, in order to investigate asymmetry related to the business cycle. In Ravn and Sola (1999) the regime switching is connected to switching in the variance of monetary policy shocks, in order to capture large vs. small monetary policy shocks. By contrast, in this paper we do not force the regime switching to correspond to any particular asymmetry. Weise (1999) is the only paper we are aware of to jointly evaluate evidence for all three asymmetries discussed above. While
Weise considers money-based indicators of monetary policy, here we also evaluate evidence for multiple asymmetries using interest-rate-based measures. 4 Thoma (1994) Asymmetry in the real effects of monetary policy can be motivated by a variety of theoretical models. First, models generating asymmetry in the rigidity of prices, specifically prices that are more rigid downward than upward, are capable of generating asymmetries in the effects of contractionary and expansionary policy. 6 Here, a positive shift in aggregate demand is primarily reflected in prices, while a negative shift is primarily reflected in output, implying that a policy contraction is more effective than policy stimulus. Second, theories of a credit channel through which monetary policy affects output can predict larger effects of monetary policy in unfavorable growth states. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) review one strain of this literature, which they call the "balance sheet" channel. Here, changes in short-term interest rates affect not only the cost of capital, but also the external finance premium. Monetary policy then has its largest effects at those times when the balance sheet channel augments the traditional interest rate channel to the greatest extent. For a variety of reasons, this is likely to be during periods of unfavorable growth states, for example during recessions. During such periods a greater 4 In addition, Weise (1999) uses a smooth transition threshold VAR, whereas the regime-switching model we use in this paper assumes discrete regime shifts. For the three specific types of asymmetry we discuss in this paper, the substantial majority of the literature has focused on sharp regime definitions: positive monetary policy shocks vs. negative, expansions vs. recessions, "big" monetary policy shocks vs. "small". Thus, the regime-switching framework we use here is partly motivated as an effort to be consistent with this literature. Also, using a Monte Carlo experiment, the results of which are available from the authors upon request, we have found that the regimeswitching framework provides sensible estimates of the within-regime parameter estimates even when the data are generated from Weise's smooth transition model. 5 See also Thoma and Gray (1998) .
proportion of firms rely on external financing and the external finance premium is larger.
Finally, many models predict asymmetry related to the size of the monetary policy action. For example, menu cost models predict that only small policy actions have large effects, since a large shock makes paying the menu cost optimal.
In the next section we formally describe the model to be estimated. Section 3 discusses the results and their implications for the nature of asymmetry in the effects of monetary policy actions. Section 4 concludes.
Empirical Model
The model we consider is an unobserved-components model with regime switching:
where t y is the log level of output, t x is a scalar variable measuring monetary policy, and t S is a regime-indicator variable taking on the values 0 or 1.
Ignoring t x in equation (4), the model in (1)- (5) Hamilton (1989) . The simplest version of this process specifies that t S switches between 0 and
The model in (1)- (6) is capable of capturing shifts in the response coefficients. However, a primary goal of this exercise is to determine not just the timing of the shifts in the response coefficients, but also whether the three asymmetries discussed in the introduction -asymmetry related to the direction of the policy action, asymmetry related to the size of the policy action, and asymmetry related to the position of the business cycle -are able to explain these shifts. To this end we augment the model to allow t S to depend on state variables linked to each of these asymmetries. Specifically, we modify equation (6) to allow the transition probabilities of the regime-switching process to be time-varying, where the time-variation depends on state variables:
Here, t z is a q x 1 vector of state variables, . The time-varying transition probability (TVTP) specification in (7) has been used in a variety of contexts, see for example Diebold, Lee and Weinbach (1994) and Filardo (1994) .
The state variables we include in t z are designed to be consistent with the existing literature testing for asymmetry. Specifically, we include dummy variables in t z that describe the size and sign of the policy action, as well as the business cycle phase at the time the policy action is taken. Because these dummy variables are meant to describe conditions prevailing at the time of the policy action, we include J lags of each dummy variable in t z , where J is the number of lags of the policy variable that enter equation (4). As is the case for the policy variable in equation (4), the contemporaneous values of the dummy variables are not included in
To specify the state variable related to the direction of the policy action, we define a dummy variable, t Dsign , which is zero if the policy action taken at time t was accommodative, and one if the policy action was contractionary. This categorization will be defined by the sign of the policy action -for example, if the policy action is an interest-rate based monetary policy shock, a negative shock is defined as accommodative and a positive shock is defined as contractionary. The state variable for asymmetry related to the size of the policy action is given by the dummy variable, t Dsize , which is zero if the policy action taken at time t is within one standard deviation of its historical mean, and one otherwise. Finally, the state variable for asymmetry related to business cycle phase is given by the dummy variable t Drec , which is zero if the economy is in an expansion, as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), and one if the economy is in a recession.
Estimation Results
In this section we discuss estimation results for the model presented in section 2. For maximum likelihood estimation, we cast the model in state space form and apply the Kim (1994) filter. This procedure is described in detail in Kim and Nelson (1999) .
Measurement of Output and Monetary Policy
We measure real output, t y , as the logarithm of quarterly U.S. industrial production. (1)- (5) is non-stationary, an unconditional expectation of the transition equation to initialize the Kalman filter portion of the Kim (1994) filter is not available. We thus initialize the filter with guesses on which we place high variance, and begin computing the likelihood function only after five years of data have passed to allow the effects of these initial guesses to dissipate.
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Thus, all output from the model will cover the third quarter of 1960 to the fourth quarter of 2002.
As a robustness check on our results, we consider two alternative measures of t x : an endogenous measure of policy, namely the change in the ex-post real interest rate, and a monetary policy shock where the M1 money supply is the monetary policy instrument. As is discussed in Section 3.5, both of these alternative policy variables yield results similar to those based on the interest-rate based monetary policy shock.
Is the Regime-Switching Significant?
In this section, we use statistical tests to determine whether the model presented in Section 2 provides a significant improvement in model fit over a model with constant response coefficients. To begin, we must first specify the lag orders, K and J. For all the versions of the model that we consider, we employ a backward lag order selection methodology in which we set a maximum lag order of four for both K and J and work backwards until a likelihood ratio test finds a significant value of either k f or
g . This procedure never chooses a lag order greater than two, thus, for the results presented in the remainder of the paper, K and J are both set equal to two. As a supplement to the likelihood ratio tests, we also performed diagnostic tests on the 10 The policy rule equation of the VAR from which the policy shock is recovered is linear. Thus, while we are allowing for asymmetry in the response of the economy to a policy shock, we do not allow for any asymmetry in the response of monetary policy to economic conditions. 11 Kim and Nelson (1999) provide detailed discussion of the issues surrounding initialization of the Kalman filter.
residuals of the estimated model. These diagnostics produced no evidence of remaining serial correlation or heteroskedasticity when K = J = 2. 12 We next turn to evaluating the significance of the regime-switching model over one with constant response coefficients. That is, we test the null hypothesis that
It is well known that the standard likelihood ratio test of this null hypothesis does not have the usual 2 c distribution, as there are nuisance parameters that are unidentified under the null hypothesis.
Several authors, for example Garcia (1998) and Hansen (1992) , have developed alternative tests of the null hypothesis of parameter constancy against the alternative of a model with regimeswitching, where the regime-switching is characterized by fixed transition probabilities such as those given in (6). Here we use the testing procedure developed by Hansen (1992) to test the significance of the FTP model given in equations (1)- (6) against the null hypothesis of constant response coefficients. The Hansen (1992) procedure provides an upper-bound of the p-value for this null hypothesis and as a result is generally thought to provide a conservative test of the null hypothesis.
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When applied to our model, the Hansen test yields a p-value of 0.11. Given that this is an upper bound, we interpret this as relatively strong evidence in favor of the model with regimeswitching response coefficients. As will be discussed further in Section 3.5, the alternative measures of t x that we consider provide even stronger evidence in favor of the regime-switching 12 Specifically, neither the Breusch-Godfrey test for the null of no serial correlation nor a Lagrange multiplier test for the null of no ARCH effects rejects at any reasonable significance level when applied to the estimated residuals. 13 The Hansen procedure involves the evaluation of the constrained likelihood over a grid of values for the nuisance parameters of the model, which in this case are 
Which Asymmetries Explain the Timing of the Regime-Shifts?
Given the evidence of instability in the response coefficients, we are next interested in whether this instability corresponds to one or more of the three specific manifestations of asymmetry described above. To this end, we estimate the TVTP model in equations (1)- (5) and (7) and investigate the significance of the dummy variables described in Section 2 when they are
First, as will be discussed further in the next section, estimation results from all the versions of the model that we consider suggest that t S is equal to one in only short bursts, generally lasting only a single quarter. Given this, there is very little variation in
is best modeled as a fixed parameter. Indeed, in none of the estimated models was the coefficient vector 1 a significant using a likelihood ratio test. Thus, in all of the versions of the model that we discuss below, 1 a is set equal to zero and we focus only on modeling time-variation in the transition In summary, the above model specification exercise suggests that our preferred model is one in which the response of the transitory component of output to lagged policy shocks varies between two regimes, with the probability that the 0 = t S regime will continue, or switch to the 1 = t S regime, dependent on whether the economy is in an NBER recession at the time the policy action is taken. In the next section we discuss the estimation results for this preferred model in more detail.
Estimation Results for Preferred Model
This section presents detailed estimation results for our preferred model, which is the model in equations (1)- (5) and (7) 14 These results relate to the debate regarding whether the trend in U.S. log output is best characterized as a broken time trend or as a stochastic trend. Of course, it is well known that distinguishing these two views of trend in the data is very difficult in practice (Campbell and Perron, 1991) . Indeed, Clark (1987) finds evidence of a large v s for U.S. real GDP using an univariate unobserved components model. In this paper we are interested in the cyclical component of output and, given that these two views of trend yield similar estimated cycles, we will not be concerned with this debate further. 15 However, Morley, Nelson and Zivot (1999) demonstrate that allowing for correlation between innovations to the stochastic trend and innovations to the transitory component can yield a transitory component that is both small and at odds with NBER dated cycles. 
, the maximum response of industrial production is much larger, reaching -2.7% and -4.1%
respectively. Finally, when 0 ,
, the maximum response is 1.0%.
Note that this final combination contains the counter-intuitive implication that a positive shock to the federal funds rate yields an increase in the cyclical component of industrial production. This result is an example of a case where models that assume a constant response of output to a policy shock mask interesting features of the data. For example, when we estimate the model in (1)-(5) assuming that the response coefficients are constant, which can usefully be thought of as averaging the responses in Figure 2 , the estimated response of industrial production to a positive federal funds rate shock is negative. This is consistent with the vast literature based on linear VAR models. However, the results in Figure 2 suggest that when 0 ,
, the correlation between these policy shocks and future output is positive. Recall from Section 3.3 that the timing of the 1 = t S regime is significantly correlated with the dates of NBER recessions. Given this, one explanation for the shape of the IRF when 0 ,
is that the Federal Reserve's information set in the standard VAR used here to extract policy shocks, particularly with regards to expected future output growth, is not well specified during recessions. In this case, the policy shocks obtained during recessions from this VAR would contain an endogenous component.
We now turn to the estimated coefficients determining the transition probabilities in (7). Finally, we turn to the estimated timing of the regime switches, which can be viewed graphically using the estimated probability that 1 = t S , which we denote ) | 1 ( t S P t = 16 . There are several items of note in these estimates, which are shown in Figure 3 . First, the model is 16 This estimate is constructed using data from When t S does switch on, it tends to remain on for only a very brief period of time, usually no more than two or three quarters. Finally, as should not be surprising given the significance of Drec in explaining time variation in the transition probabilities, there is a strong correspondence between the 1 = t S regime and NBER recession dates, which are the shaded areas on the graph.
is high is in close proximity to one of the NBER recessions in the sample. Also, around every NBER recession in the sample there is at least one episode in which
The striking correspondence between the 1 = t S regime and the business cycle provides a useful robustness check on a growing literature finding that U.S. monetary policy actions tend to predict output much more significantly during recessions than during expansions (see for example Garcia and Schaller (2002) ). Figure 3 suggests this result is fairly robust across the historical record of business cycles. In other words, this result is not being driven by only a small subset of recessions.
Robustness Checks: Alternative Measures of Monetary Policy
In this section we investigate the robustness of the results obtained above to two alternative measures of t x . The first is an endogenous measure of monetary policy, namely the change in the ex-post real interest rate, measured as the quarterly average federal funds rate less the 4 quarter percentage change in the GDP price deflator. The second is a monetary policy shock in which the Federal Reserve's monetary policy instrument is the M1 money supply. This is obtained from a recursively identified four variable VAR in which M1 is ordered after the log of real GDP and the log of the GDP price deflator and before the federal funds rate. Due to data limitations on the M1 variable, the model is estimated beginning in the first quarter of 1965 for this measure of t x .
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The response coefficients linking the cyclical component of industrial production to the alternative measures of t x appear well characterized by regime-switching. The Hansen (1992) test of the null hypothesis of constant regime-coefficients against the alternative of the FTP model in equations (1)- (6) yields a p-value of 0.03 for the model in which t x is the change in the ex-post real federal funds rate, and 0.04 for the model in which t x is the money based monetary policy shock. In Table 3 , we show the results of a model comparison exercise to determine which asymmetry dummy variables are able to explain the regime-switching. The results for the model in which t x is measured as the change in the ex-post real federal funds rate are very similar to those for the federal funds rate based monetary policy shock in We now consider the estimation results from these preferred models. Figures 3 and 4 show the regime dependent impulse response functions, computed as discussed in Section 3.3, to a one standard deviation tightening of t x . For the change in the ex-post real federal funds rate, this is equal to a 95 basis point increase in the real federal funds rate, while for the M1 based monetary policy shock this is equal to an 0.7% decrease in the M1 money supply. increases considerably when the policy shock observed during a recession is a stimulus rather than a tightening. This is consistent with the results of Weise (1999) , who, using a three variable threshold vector autoregression consisting of the consumer price index, industrial production and the M1 money supply, finds that policy stimulus taken when output is declining has a larger effect than a policy contraction.
Finally, we consider the timing of the regime switches for the alternative policy measures. Figures 5 and 6 , which show the filtered probabilities ) | 1 ( t S P t = , demonstrate that the timing is similar to that obtained when t x is measured using the federal funds rate based monetary policy shock. Specifically, as was the case in Figure 3 , ) | 1 ( t S P t = is high infrequently and briefly. Also, the periods in which ) | 1 ( t S P t = spike up is highly correlated with NBER recessions.
Conclusion
A growing literature has investigated asymmetries in the effects of U.S. monetary policy on the real economy. In this paper we have used a Markov regime-switching model to investigate time variation in the response of the cyclical component of output to monetary policy actions. A time-varying transition probability specification allows us to explain the regime shifts using state variables that are linked to three particular manifestations of asymmetry: Asymmetry related to the direction of the monetary policy action, asymmetry related to the existing business cycle phase and asymmetry related to the size of the policy action.
The results suggest substantial, statistically significant, time variation in the coefficients describing the response of output to a monetary policy action, and that this time-variation corresponds to "high response" and "low response" regimes. The time-varying transition proability model yields strong evidence that the time variation in the response of output can be explained by a dummy variable indicating whether the economy is in a recession at the time the policy action is taken. In particular, policy actions taken during recessions seem to have larger effects than those taken during expansions. This result appears to be robust across the historical record of business cycles, that is, it does not appear to be driven by only a small subset of recessions. We find much less evidence of any asymmetry related to the direction or size of the policy action.
Our finding that output responds more to policy actions taken during recessions than those taken during expansions is consistent with a growing literature, including Garcia and Schaller (2002) for the United States, Peersman and Smets (2001) for the euro area and
Kaufmann (2002) for Austrian data. However, the results are not supportive of the literature, for example Cover (1992) and DeLong and Summers (1988) , that finds that output responds more to a policy contraction than a policy stimulus. For policy variables based on interest rates, we find no evidence of any asymmetry related to the direction of the policy actions. When the policy measure is based on the M1 money supply, we find that a policy stimulus has larger output effects than a policy contraction, but only when taken during recessions. This is consistent with the results of Weise (1999) who, using a three variable threshold vector autoregressive model consisting of the consumer price index, industrial production and the M1 money supply, finds that policy stimulus taken when output is declining has a larger effect than a policy contraction.
Finally, our results are in general not supportive of a literature, see for example Ravn and Sola (1999) , that documents asymmetry related to the size of the policy action. While we do find some evidence of this sort of asymmetry when it is the only type of asymmetry considered, it does not retain its significance once it is considered jointly with asymmetry related to the business cycle.
The results presented here leave open the important question of why policy actions would have larger effects in recessions. As was noted in the introduction, one theory posits that the "balance-sheet" channel of monetary policy augments the traditional interest rate channel to a greater extent during recessions than during recession. Peersman and Smets (2002) have provided some evidence in favor of this theory using industry level data for seven euro area countries. They find that those industries for which business cycle asymmetry in the effects of monetary policy is greatest tend to be those with firm size and financial structure characteristics that make them most susceptible to a "balance-sheet" channel. 
. This is a boundary value for the transition probability and creates difficulties in inverting the information matrix. Thus, when computing standard errors for the other parameters we constrained 0 c to its maximum likelihood estimate. y , from the model in equations (1)- (5) and (7) to a positive shock to the federal funds rate at time t-1, computed as described in Section 3.4. The size of the shock is equal to the standard deviation of historical federal funds rate shocks, computed from an identified VAR. , from the model in equations (1)- (5) and (7), when )' , ( to a positive change in the ex-post real federal funds rate at time t-1, computed as described in Section 3.4. The size of the change is equal to the standard deviation of historical real federal funds rate changes. to a negative shock to the M1 money supply at time t-1, computed as described in Section 3.4. The size of the shock is equal to the standard deviation of historical M1 shocks, computed from an identified VAR. 
